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Abstract
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public key cryptosystem where a unique identity string,
such as an e-mail address, can be used as a public key. IBE is simpler than the traditional PKI
since certificates are not needed. An IBE scheme is usually based on pairing of discrete points
on elliptic curves. An IBE scheme can also be based on quadratic residuosity. This paper
presents an overview of these IBE schemes and surveys present IBE based security services.
Private key management is described in detail with protocols to authenticate users of Private Key
Generation Authorities (PKG), to protect submission of generated private keys, and to avoid the
key escrow problem. In the security service survey IBE implementations for smartcards, for
smart phones, for security services in mobile networking, for security services in health care
information systems, for secure web services, and for grid network security are presented. Also
the performance of IBE schemes is estimated.
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1. Introduction
The traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) provides strong security but has turned out to be
difficult to use for an average user. Furthermore, PKI causes, especially in mobile devices, a high
load on the computational power and the bandwidth. Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a public
key cryptosystem where an arbitrary identity string is a valid public key. Public key certificates
and certificate revocation lists (CRLs) are therefore not needed. Computationally costly
certificate and CRL management is avoided.
IBE concept was first introduced in (Shamir, 1984). The first practical IBE scheme proposed in
(Boneh & Franklin 2001) was followed by vast research on IBE. A security flaw in the Boneh &
Franklin scheme has been removed (Galindo, 2005), several variants of these schemes have been
proposed (Boneh & Boyen 2004; Gentry, 2006; Al-Riyami & Paterson 2003; Sahai & Waters,
2007), IBE signature schemes have been proposed (Cha & Cheon, 2002; IBE, 2007), a different
practical IBE scheme has been proposed (Cocks, 2001), IETF standardization of IBE has started

(Appenzeller et al. 2007), and IBE based security services have been integrated in commercial
security products (Voltage, 2007; NoreTech, 2004; Gemplus, 2005).
Authentication, protected data communication, stored data protection, and non-repudiation
signatures are examples of security services, which can be implemented with IBE. Requirements
for authentication services are IBE based signing, signature verification, encryption and
decryption. Requirements for protected data communication and stored data protection are IBE
based encryption and decryption. Requirements for non-repudiation signatures are generation
and distribution of private user keys without key escrow, IBE based signing, and IBE based
signature verification.

2. IBE Requirements for Security Services
An IBE scheme consists of four algorithms (Boneh & Franklin 2003):
• Setup – A master private key and public IBE parameters are generated by a Private Key
Generation Authority (PKG)
• Extract – The private user key associated with an arbitrary public key string is generated
with the master private key
• Encrypt with the public user key
• Decrypt with the associated private user key.
An IBE scheme can be based on an operation called pairing defined for a pair of discrete elliptic
curve points or on quadratic residuosity. Elliptic Curve Public Key Cryptosystems are described
in detail for example in (Menezes, 1994).
Software and/or hardware for IBE and a PKG are required for security service implementations.
Two open source software libraries for pairing implementations are presently available (Identity,
2007; PBC, 2007). Software implementations of quadratic residuosity are supported by number
theoretic functions in the GMP library (GMP, 2007).
Secure private user key generation and distribution requires
• authentication of legitimate PKG users
• protected data communication between the PKG and authenticated users.
Three methods have hitherto been used to preserve some benefit of IBE cryptosystems without
introducing full key escrow by default:
• Threshold techniques to distribute the secret master key
• Embedment of a user generated component in a private key issued by a PKG
• Use of an Accountable Authority Identity based Encryption (A-IBE) scheme for which the
existence of multiple private keys for the same identity string can be proved and detected.

2.1 Pairing
Let G1 and G2 be two groups of prime order q. We assume that G1 is an additive group, G2 is a
multiplicative group and the discrete logarithm problem is hard in both groups. A bilinear
mapping (pairing) e: G1 χ G1 Æ G2 satisfies the following properties:

•
•

Bilinearity. For all P,Q Є G1 and R,S Є G2, e(P+Q,R)=e(P,R)·e(Q,R)
e(P,R+S)=e(P,R)·e(P,S)
Non-degeneracy. For all generators P Є G1, e(P,P) is a generator of G2.

and

Four pairing types have hitherto been defined: Weil, Tate, Eta or ηT, and ATE pairing (Boneh &
Franklin 2001; Gailbraith et al. 2002; Hess et al., 2006)

2.2 Quadratic Residuosity
The Jacobi symbol (b/N) for two integers b and N is defined by (b/N)=0 if N divides b, (b/N)=1
if b is a square mod N, and (b/N)=-1 otherwise. For a given b and N odd such that (b/N)= 1, then
the Quadratic Residuosity problem is to find an x for which b = x2 mod N. This problem can be
solved efficiently only if the prime factors of N are known. The Quadratic Residuosity problem
is believed to be computationally hard for unknown prime factors of N. (Cocks, 2001)

2.3 Identity based Encryption and Decryption Schemes
An identity string as such is a public key in an IBE scheme without a random oracle. An IBE
scheme with a random oracle uses a hash of an identity string as a public key. In a hierarchical
IBE scheme the identities are organized in a hierarchy tree (Gentry & Silverberg 2002). A
hierarchical scheme is a generalization of identity based encryption. A fuzzy IBE scheme (Sahai
& Waters 2007) allows an error tolerance in the identity when attempting to decrypt a message.
An exact replica of the identity is not required to allow decryption. A fuzzy IBE scheme
example is to use a measurement of a human biometric feature as an identity, which can change
from one measurement to another. Characteristics of some IBE schemes are summarized in
Table 1.

2.4 Authentication of Legitimate PKG Users
For authentication of legitimate PKG users, a publicly available user registration database
maintained by the PKG is proposed in (Kumar, 2006) for a pairing based IBE scheme:
• A user UID, where ID is an identity string used as a user public key, chooses a nonce rID in
the finite field defined by q and submits <ID,( rID-1 mod q)·P> to the PKG
• The PKG verifies user credentials and registers the user by storing <ID,( rID-1 mod q)·P> in
the database
• The PKG issues a proof of registration prfID = s·H(ID||( rID-1 mod q)·P) to the user.
A registered user requests a private key by submitting <ID, rID·P> to the PKG. The PKG fetches
rID-1 mod q corresponding to ID from the database and authenticates the user by checking if
e(rID·P,(rID-1 mod q) ·P) equals e(P,P).

2.5 Protected Private Key Submission
The private key of an authenticated user UID can be submitted by a PKG using an existing secure
connection. If no secure connection exists, then the blinding technique proposed in (Kumar,
2006) can be used for a pairing based IBE cryptosystem. The PKG chooses a nonce x in the
finite field defined by q, calculates the blinded private key W= s·QID+x·P, V=x·(rID-1 mod q) ·P
and submits <W,V> to the authenticated user. On receiving <W,V> the user UID unblinds the
private key by calculating s·QID=W- rID·V. The correctness of the received blinded private key is

verified by user UID, if e(s·QID,P) equals e(QID,s·P). The security of blinding is relies on the
hardness to solve the Elliptic Discrete Logarithmic Problem.
Proposed
in
Based on
Random
oracle
Private
master key

(Boneh & Franklin 2003)
pairing
yes
PKG chooses random sєZq*

Public IBE prime q, G1, G2, pairing e, a
Parameters generator point P of G1, public
master key Ppub=s·P, integer n,
hash functions H1:{0,1}*ÆG1,
H2: G2Æ{0, 1}n
Private
suser=s·H1(IDuser)
user key

(Boneh
2004)
pairing
no

&

Boyen (Cocks, 2001)
quadratic residuosity
yes

PKG chooses random PKG chooses random
(x,y)ЄZq*
primes (p, q), where p
mod 4=q mod 4=3
prime q, G1, G2, public master key
pairing e, a generator n=p·q, hash function
point P of G1, public H: H(IDuser) is integer
master key (x·P,y·P)
i for which (i/n)=1 or
(-i/n)=1
*
(r, K) where rЄZq is suser=square root mod
random
and n of i or of n-i
K=P/(IDuser+x+r·y).

Encrypt

encrypted message M is (U,V)
where
U=r·P,
V=M⊕H2(e(H1(IDuser),Ppub)r)), and
rєZq* is random

encrypted
message
MЄG2 is C=(X,Y,Z)
where
X=IDuser·t·P+t·x·P,
Y=t·y·P,
and
Z=e(P,P)t·M),
tЄZq* is random

For each message bit
bЄ{+1,-1} is picked
random {t,t´}ЄZn* for
which (t/n)=(t´/n)=b.
Encryption of b is
(c1,c2)= ((t+(i/t)) mod
n, (t´+(-i/t´)) mod n)

Decrypt

M= V⊕H2(e(suser,U))

M = Z/e(X + r·Y, K)

For each b: if (i/n)=1
then b=((2·suser+c1)/n)
if
(-i/n)=1
then
b=((2·suser+c2)/n)

Table 1: Characteristics of some IBE schemes

2.6 Private Keys without Key Escrow Feature
Three trust levels are defined in (Girault, 1991) for a Trusted Third Party (TTP), which generates
private keys in IBE:
• Level I. The TTP knows or can easily compute the private keys of users and can therefore
impersonate any user at any time without being detected. The key escrow problem is thus
unresolved.

•
•

Level II. The TTP does not know or cannot easily compute the private keys of users.
However, the TTP can still impersonate a user by generating a false public key without being
detected.
Level III. The TTP does not know or cannot easily compute the private keys of users.
Moreover, a proof method exists with which a false public key for a user can be revealed.
Thus the TTP cannot impersonate a user by generating a false public key.

For role based IBE security services in an organization trust level I is acceptable, if the
organization acts as the TTP. Trust level I is even necessary for a role, which can be transferred
from one person to another person. Example of role based security services are
• authentication for using computing, networking, and information resources
• protected storage of information associated with the role.
However, for non-repudiation IBE based signature services only trust level III is acceptable.
2.6.1
Distribution of a Secret Master Key across Multiple Key Issuing Authorities
In some proposals to distribute the secret master key multiple PKGs are used to generate private
user key shares. The public master key of each PKG must be included in the public IBE
parameters. A user requesting a private key constructs the private key from a subset of these
shares with a threshold technique using Lagrange multipliers (Gemmell,1997). In this approach
to avoid key escrow, proposed for example in (Boneh & Franklin 2003; Paterson, 2002; Hess,
2003), trust level III is obtained if at least one of the PKGs, which are selected by a user
requesting a private key, is honest. However, the user must be registered at each PKG and each
PKG must independently check and authenticate the user identity.
Another approach to distribute the secret master key is to use only one PKG and multiple Key
Privacy Authorities (KPAs). A private user key issued by the PKG is then combined with the
private shares of the KPAs selected by a user requesting a private key. The cost of user
authentication is reduced, since only one PKG authenticates the user. Some distributed private
key issuing protocols based on this approach have however been shown to obtain only trust level
I in (Kumar et al. 2006), where another proposed distributed private key issuing protocol based
on one PKG and multiple KPAs is proved to fulfill the requirements of trust level III. The
protocol proposed in (Kumar et al. 2006) for pairing based IBE cryptosystems is a (t, n)
threshold protocol with secure distribution of generated private user key shares. The (t, n)
threshold property means distributed generation of a private user key with one PKG and n Key
Privacy Authorities (KPA), of which at most t<n are allowed to be dishonest. The distribution of
generated private keys is protected by the blinding technique described in section 2.5.
2.6.2
Embedment of a User Generated Component in a Private Key
Embedding a user generated component in the private key issued by a PKG eliminates the key
escrow problem, but a fundamental advantage of IBE is lost. Encryption with a user identity
string and public IBE parameters is not possible since also the public key component associated
with the user generated private key component is needed. However, some public key
management advantage of IBE in comparison with a pure PKI cryptosystem is still preserved.
Certificate-Based Encryption (CBE) and Certificateless Public Key Cryptography (CL-PKC) are
two slightly different implementations of this approach.

In CBE, introduced in (Gentry, 2003), the IBE component of the private user key is timedependent and is used as an implicit decryption certificate, which the PKG can deliver without
protection. To get the IBE component of the private key, a user must deliver both an identity
string and the public key component associated with the self-generated private key component.
Certificate management is simple, since certificates are IBE generated. Only certificate validity
times must be checked. There are no certification chains and no certificate revocation lists with
associated management as in PKI. However, the PKG must renew a certificate before its validity
time expires. In (Gentry, 2003) a CBE implementation based on the IBE scheme in (Boneh & Franklin
2003) is described.

CL-PKC, introduced in (Al-Riyami & Paterson 2003), is closely related to CBE. The difference
is that private user key generation starts with generation of the IBE component, which depends
only on the user identity string and must be delivered by the PKG through a secure
communication channel. The full private user key is obtained by combining the IBE component
with a user secret. The associated public key is derived by combining this user secret with the
public IBE parameters. No certificate for the public user key is needed, since the trust in the user
identity is derived from the generation of the IBE component of the private key. A private user
key can even be derived afterwards from an identity string, since the public user key is
independent of this string. In (Al-Riyami & Paterson 2003) a CL-PKC implementation based on
the IBE scheme in (Boneh & Franklin 2003) is described.
2.6.3
Accountable Authority Identity based Encryption (A-IBE)
Key escrow in IBE means that a PKG can decrypt all information encrypted using an ID string in
combination with the public IBE parameters of the PKG. A malicious PKG can also distribute
copies of issued private keys to third parties.
In (Goyal, 2007) is introduced a private key issuing scheme called Accountable Authority
Identity based Encryption (A-IBE). The probability to generate an exact copy of an issued
private key for the same identity string is negligible for an A-IBE scheme. In an A-IBE scheme
there is only one PKG with a secret master key, but there is still a super-polynomial number of
possible private keys corresponding to every identity string. A user requesting a private key for
an identity string will get one of all possible private keys. The PKG doesn’t know which one of
these possible private keys will be issued to the user, because the selection is based on private
user data. A malicious PKG can of course generate another private key for the same identity
string. Also this private key is a valid decryption key, but it will most probably be different from
the private key issued to the user. If the PKG delivers a second private key to a third party, then
the authentic user can by comparing the keys prove that the second private key is different from
the authentic private key.
In the A-IBE scheme introduced in (Goyal, 2007), the set of possible private keys for an identity
string consists of a super-polynomial number of key families. The family of a private key issued
for an identity string by a PKG to a user depends on private user data. If another private key is
issued for the same identity string without access to this private data, then the probability is
negligible that both private keys belong to the same key family. The A-IBE scheme is thus an
IBE scheme extended with the algorithm Trace, which outputs a family number for an inputted
private key.

Two pairing based A-IBE implementations are in (Goyal, 2007) described and proved to have
the required security properties.

3. Survey of Implemented and Proposed Security Services
In this section both commercial and non-commercial IBE based security services are presented.

3.1 Secure E-mail
Voltage SecureMail was the first commercial IBE providing e-mail signing and encryption
(Voltage, 2007). Figure 1 illustrates how a user (Alice) can send IBE encrypted e-mail to another
user (Bob). Bob is assumed to receive his first encrypted e-mail. In step 1, Alice encrypts the email message using Bob’s e-mail address, “bob@b.com”, as the public key. When Bob receives
the encrypted e-mail, he contacts and authenticates to the PKG (step 2). In step 3, after
successful authentication, the PKG sends to Bob his private key needed in the e-mail message
decryption.

Figure 1: Sending secure mail using IBE.

3.2 Smartcard and Smart Phone Implementations
Smartcards can be used for secure private key storage and are currently common in traditional
PKI environments. Gemplus has developed a prototype smart card performing IBE based
encryption/decryption. This smartcard called Smart IBE, implements the whole Boneh-Franklin
protocol. The entire pairing computation is performed on the smartcard. With Smart IBE, a user
can e.g. send an encrypted SMS message using the recipients phone number as public key.
(Gemplus, 2005)

NoreTech (NoreTech, 2004) has developed prototype implementations for Symbian OS and
Microsoft Smartphone OS based mobile phones (McCullagh, 2005). The prototype
implementations include toolkits and e-mail solutions based on recent IBE techniques.

3.3 Authentication and Key Agreement for Mobility Protocols
3.3.1
Mobile IPv4
In (Lee et. al., 2003) a Mobile IP authentication protocol using IBE is proposed. In Mobile IP, a
Mobile Node (MN) located in a foreign network often needs to use resources provided by the
foreign domain. An Authentication Authorization and Accounting (AAA) infrastructure provided
by protocols such as RADIUS or Diameter is commonly used to verify the user’s credentials and
for billing. The entities in this IBE environment are the MN, the HA, and the AAA server in the
MN’s home network (AAAH). All nodes involved in the Mobile IP and AAA environment must
be able to calculate IBE operations. AAAH is a PKG for the MNs. Network Access Identifiers
(NAI) are used as IDs. Hence, the HA and the MN has private keys corresponding to their NAIs.
The MN and its HA performs mutual authentication through the FA and the AAAH. The
authentication exchange is shown in Figure 2 where:
• ID = Identity. In this proposal NAI is used as ID
• SID = Private key corresponding to ID
• aaah@ = NAI of AAAH
• ha@ = NAI of HA
• mn@ = NAI of MN
• M_ = Message
• <<M>>SID = Signature of M with private key SID
• {M}ID = Encryption of M with ID.
3.3.2
Mobile IPv6
In Mobile IPv6 (Johnson et al. 2004), mutual authentication between a mobile node and its home
agent is obligatory and normally uses IPSec (Internet Protocol Security). IKE (Internet Key
Exchange) (Kaufman, 2005) is currently the only key agreement protocol in IPSec.
Authentication in IKE is presently based on shared secrets, X.509 certificates, or EAP
(Extensible Authentication Protocol) but could be modified to use IBE instead of certificates.
The Return Routability (RR) procedure is the standardised solution for securing communication
between a mobile node and a correspondent node. This solution is however lightweight and
vulnerable. To the RR procedure based on PKI have therefore been proposed alternatives (Vogt
& Arkko 2007; Dupont & Combes 2007; Bao et al. 2007), which could be modified to use IBE
instead of certificates.
3.3.3
SIP
An extension, providing identity-based authentication and key agreement, for the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) is proposed in (Ring et. al. 2006). SIP Secure (SIPS) is a HTTP Secure
(HTTPS) like protocol providing end to end security and certificate-based user authentication in
SIP. In the proposal, a strong IBE based user authentication mechanism is presented which can

be implemented without changing the HTTP authentication semantics. A user’s SIP identity,
user@domain, is used as public key.

Figure 2: Proposed mutual Mobile IP authentication scheme based on IBE.

3.4 Health Care Information Systems
In (Mont et al. 2003) is presented an innovative IBE based solution to role based secure
messaging. Confidential e-mails are encrypted using textual strings as public keys. These strings
describe the disclosure policies (terms and conditions) under which the content of an e-mail can
be disclosed, specifically a list of roles. A user can for example send a confidential e-mail to any
consultant by using “Consultant” as a public key. The solution has been fully implemented and is
currently used in a trial environment (a European health service organization) with Microsoft
Outlook 2000 and an IBE Add-in as e-mail client. A web based HTTPS protected Trust
Authority (TA) Service generates private user keys. A protected Microsoft SQL Server database
contains up-to-date role lists and associations of people’s identities to their current roles..

3.5 Secure Web Services
Proposals for how IBE may be used to simplify web security services are presented in (Crampton
et al. 2007). Various ways of using IBE in public key distribution, access control, and securing
XML (Extensible Markup Language) messages are discussed. A suite of key management
services for the deployment of IBE in web services, called ID-XKMS (Identity – XML Key
Management Specification), is also proposed.

3.6 Grid Security
In (Wei Lim, 2006) is proposed
• a fully identity-based key infrastructure for a grid, IKIG (Identity based Key Infrastructure
for Grid),

•
•

an alternative identity based approach, DKIG (Dynamic Key Infrastructure for Grid)
a new password based protocol using IBE keys.

The idea of IKIG is to replace the current security services provided by GSI (Grid Security
Infrastructure) in the Globus Toolkit (Globus, 2007) with some selected properties of
Hierarchical Identity-Based Cryptography (HIBC). GSI is based on a PKI with X.509
certificates. DKIG is intended to solve the key escrow problem by combining IBE and the
current PKI approach. Each user publishes a fixed parameter with a standard X.509 certificate.
Even though X.509 certificates are involved, DKIG is still more lightweight than GSI since the
derivation of both long-term and proxy credentials on-the-fly is enabled only for a fixed
certificate. The password based protocol is a TLS-like IBE protocol for securing interactions
between users and credential storage systems, such as MyProxy (MyProxy, 2007).

4. Performance of IBE Schemes
IBE offers functional advantages over conventional public key methods, but the computational
costs or data communication costs are higher.

4.1 Pairing based IBE Schemes
IBE operation performance depends on the required number and the execution times of the
following costly operations:
• pairing.
• field exponentiation (integer exponentiation in a finite field)
• point multiplication (integer multiplication of a discrete elliptic curve point in a finite field)
Encryption or decryption requires one pairing and one point multiplication. Encryption also
requires one field exponentiation. As a comparison, only one field exponentiation is required in
RSA encryption or decryption. However, for equal information security, the field size in RSA is
about seven times the group size in IBE. Field exponentiation is therefore significantly more
expensive for RSA. Execution time measurements on a 3 GHZ Pentium IV computer are shown
in Table 2. To provide the same information security, 1024 bit RSA keys and an IBE group size
of about 160 bit are used. IBE encryption/decryption is measured to be more than twice as
expensive as RSA encryption.
The execution time of pairing on a 3 GHZ Pentium computer can however be reduced with two
decades with a hardware accelerator. In (Beuchat et al. 2007) is described a 150 MHz FPGA
based accelerator for GF(397) with a pairing time of about 30 μs.

4.2 IBE Schemes Based on Quadratic Residuosity
Encryption and decryption is computationally very cheap in comparison with both pairing and
RSA, since required operations (hashing, modulo inverses of integers, and calculation of Jacobi
symbols) are fast. However, data communication is expensive. Since each encrypted bit must be
represented by two 1024 bit integers to achieve 1024 bit RSA security, only about 0.05% of the
available bandwidth is utilized.

Pairing
Point multiplication
Field exponentiation
RSA decryption

GF(2379) ηT pairing
3.88
1.82
1.14
1.92

GF(p) Tate pairing
2.91
3.08
0.54

GF(p)Ate pairing
3.10
1.17
0.62

Table 2: Execution times in milliseconds on a 3GHz Pentium IV computer (Scott, 2007).

5. Conclusions
Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is a very important area in cryptology research. The first
concrete IBE system based on pairing of discrete points on elliptic curves was proposed in
(Boneh & Franklin, 2001). IBE schemes based on quadratic residuosity have also been proposed.
The implementation of IBE in security services is still in an early stage, but many proposals have
already been presented. IBE software has been developed and is available also as open source
software. Commercial security software with security services implemented with IBE is
available and IETF standardization of IBE has started.
A key issue in the implementation of security services is private key management. For secure
distribution of private keys generated by a PKG over unprotected communication channels,
blinding techniques based on the elliptic curve cryptography and pairing operations have been
proposed and implemented.
Key escrow in IBE is a consequence of the requirement that all private user keys must be created
from the same master key in a PKG. Key escrow can be avoided by a proper use of threshold
cryptography when private user keys are issued. However, the required distributed PKG
architecture adds significant complexity to an IBE scheme.
The most important advantage of IBE is that management of public key certificates and
certificate revocation lists is not needed, since a public user key is an identity string. This is
especially an advantage for mobile computing devices with limited bandwidth and limited
computational power. However, the computational costs of the actual cryptographic operations
are higher in IBE than in traditional public key methods.
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